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Abstract 
 Cryptocurrency, or digital currency that utilizes blockchain technology and cryptography 
to encode transactions, has excited many with the promise of minimizing governance. Although 
the structure of cryptocurrency is inherently decentralized, cryptocurrency relies upon complex 
relationships between different actors with various functions and roles.. The execution of 
cryptocurrency thus depends on the mutually satisfying interactions of these actors, who form the 
basis for non-technical governance structures.   
This paper investigates the extent to which technical governance mitigates traditional 
governance problems by examining the governance structures of two cryptocurrencies. It first 
gives background into the origin and technical value proposition of cryptocurrency, as well as 
governance theory, before analyzing Bitcoin and Ethereum to understand whEther technology 
mitigates actors’ motivations. This paper finds that despite cryptocurrency’s promise of 
minimizing governance, both Bitcoin and Ethereum rely heavily on trust networks, indicating 
that elements of non-technical governance are, in fact, crucial to their effectiveness.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Origins of Cryptocurrency 
 Although many consider cryptocurrency to be a recent phenomenon, the idea of applying 
cryptographic elements to digital currency was in fact first pioneered in 1982. Dr. David Chaum, 
a researcher in the field of cryptography and mathematics, put forth the idea as the first solution 
to high governance costs in monetary contractions. Chaum was primarily concerned with finding 
a e-money solution that was both anonymous and free from double spending, a common issue in 
digital payments where a unit of money can be spent on multiple transactions simultaneously 
(Chaum 1983, 200). At the time, there were two major hurdles in the creation and adoption of 
digital currency: the first was the ability of digital signatures to be easily copied and reproduced, 
endangering users’ personal information and bank account data; the second was people’s concern 
with the level of automation inherent in digital systems (Lee ed. 2016, 1015). Chaum’s solution 
to these problems incorporated a trusted third party (TTP), usually a bank, to approve the use of 
e-money through a cryptographic digital signature. The signature was designed to be randomized 
such that banks could not track the payment or amount back to the spender, ensuring anonymity 
(Lee ed. 1016). Chaum’s exploratory digital currency, DigiCash, and other similar digital 
currencies appeared in the 1980s and 1990s but were commercially unsuccessful, largely due to a 
declining user base (Higgins 2014). Furthermore, the inclusion of TTPs did not provide a valid 
enough incentive to use an online system at a time when technology had not reached widespread 
adoption, and DigiCash incurred high costs to integrate e-commerce practices with established 
banks (Higgins). However, this period saw the rise of digital payment verification systems and 
online cards, such as PayPal, which increased awareness for the application of technology to 
personal banking (Higgins). Despite its failure, DigiCash dictated future research into digital 
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currencies that completely eliminated the need for institutional structures and TTPs to generate 
user buy-in, which set the stage for the creation of the modern cryptocurrency.  
 
Emergence of Bitcoin: 
It is impossible to discuss the emergence of cryptocurrency without first characterizing 
blockchain, its underlying technical infrastructure. Blockchain refers to the system of 
independently verified and cryptographically linked blocks that comprise a single immutable 
ledger. On a blockchain, transactions are stored using Merkle Tree, a structure that stores a 
hierarchy of hashes of data, to record all previous blocks on the system (Conti et. al. 4). The 
system thus preserves a history of all activity that exists electronically across multiple 
participants and cannot be modified by any single user. The idea of blockchain was first 
conceptualized by Satoshi Nakamoto (pseudonym) in 2008 in his landmark paper “Bitcoin: A 
Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System” as the infrastructure to support his digital currency, 
Bitcoin. Its creation was aimed to stem the growing transaction costs and security concerns that 
consumers faced in the financial markets by building upon Chaum’s initial ideas, and improving 
the technology behind digital currency. Thus, cryptocurrency was essentially founded on the 
basis of reducing costs associated with governance that had largely been handled by TTPs.  
The technical infrastructure of Bitcoin has two major developments from previous digital 
currencies. As the first successful decentralized “cryptocurrency”, Bitcoin applied the use of 
cryptography, or the practice of securing data using algorithms and protocols, to protect 
information that existed on the currency’s network (Dent 2006, 3215). Specifically, Bitcoin 
employed hash functions, or functions that mapped inputs to outputs, in order to identify 
payments (Lee ed. 1017). Furthermore, Bitcoin used digital signatures as binding approvals to 
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legitimate the transfer of money (Lee ed. 1017). The creation of both hash functions and digital 
signatures preempted Bitcoin’s success relative to its predecessors, ensuring security on the 
system. 
Bitcoin primarily mitigated the need for TTPs by employing a distributed ledger, 
effectively replacing trust with cryptographic proofs (Nakamoto 2008, 1). Nakamoto defined a 
Bitcoin as a “chain of digital signatures” that effectively linked a hash of previous payments to 
the account of the future coin owner (2). For transactions to occur between participants in the 
system, this required they be publicly announced, and developed a central immutable history of 
when payments were received. As such, the system proposed the use of a timestamp server, 
which published the hash of a block of transactions onto the chain while simultaneously 
reinforcing the timestamps before it. In place of a single TTP, Nakamoto proposed to employ a 
system of widely distributed intermediaries, termed “miners” because their activities correlated 
with the creation of new coins, in order to approve transactions. Bitcoin also used an asymmetric 
cryptosystem, which utilized both a public key, an identifier that could be used to send and 
receive payments on the network, and a private key, known only to the user to protect personal 
information (Dent 3217). Theoretically, this would allow users to interact with the blockchain 
network without using any unique identifiers, preserving anonymity, instead of conferring 
sensitive information in TTPs to process payments. 
An end-to-end overview of a common Bitcoin transaction according to Nakamoto would 
occur as follows. A user might generate a transaction to another user by using the payee’s public 
key. This transaction would contain several key components: the version of Bitcoin; the hash or 
ID of the transaction; and several inputs, including a reference to the previous transaction that 
coin was involved in (transferring it from an output to an input), an index of previous unspent 
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output, and unlocking script conditions that ensure that the unspent previous transaction output 
(UTXO) is sufficient to cover the subsequent transaction. Because the new input would be 
generated entirely from the previous transaction, the entire value of the previous transaction 
would also be featured in the output. If the value of the amount to be transferred were to be less 
than the UTXO, the sender would provide the public key of an additional wallet (usually one of 
their own) to receive the difference. This would give every coin, spent or unspent, a historical 
ledger account. The transaction is then added to a block, which refers to the series of successive 
transactions that are grouped togEther in the ledger (Nakamoto 3-4). 
In order to prevent double spending, Bitcoin utilizes a distributed consensus and proof-
of-work mechanism. Distributed consensus refers to the majority of miners that validate a 
transaction before it is added to the blockchain (Lee ed. 1099). The proof-of-work (PoW) 
mechanism is a cryptographic puzzle that requires miners to find a value, termed a nonce, that 
when hashed, produces a number with a certain number of zeroes that precedes it (Nakamoto 3). 
The puzzle increases in difficulty every two weeks in order that the system stays competitive; 
this, in turn, ensures that the money supply grows at a fixed rate in its pursuit of the Bitcoin fixed 
supply (3). PoW has a consensus algorithm that imposes five primary rules: input/output values 
must be rational; transactions can only spend unspent outputs; all inputs have to contain valid 
digital signatures (e.g. valid historical transactions); transactions must be spent within a certain 
number of blocks of their creation; and no transactions can spend inputs before the stated 
locktime (Nakamoto 7). Miners collect transactions in blocks by calculating the hash of that 
block in addition to the nonces of the individual transactions (3). Most cryptocurrencies employ 
a unique hash function that corresponds to the target hash value (Bitcoin’s hash function is 
termed SHA-256 for the 256 bit number that is produced) (Lee ed. 1016). The difficulty of the 
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puzzle is correlated directly to the target value ascribed, as lower target values correspond to 
fewer solutions. When a miner calculates the correct hash value for a block, it immediately 
broadcasts the block in the network, after which all other nodes will independently verify the 
value by comparing it to the target value, and add it to their local blockchains (Nakamoto 4). The 
Bitcoin infrastructure targets an average mining time of 10 minutes per block (Bitcoin Wiki 
“Block”). Miners are compensated with a fixed fee of newly mined coins, as well as a transaction 
fee (decided at the discretion of the user who initiates the transaction). (Nakamoto 3-4) 
In sum, Bitcoin’s value proposition primarily promises a governance system that is based 
on blockchain. It grants a number of benefits: anonymity to users and miners through its 
asymmetric cryptosystem; cheaper transactions due to the elimination of TTPs; incentive 
structures for miners built into its technical infrastructure; stable currency value; inclusive 
financial access; and finally, public documentation of all transactions that can be viewed by any 
and all parties (The Bitcoin Foundation “The Bitcoin Foundation Manifesto” 2). The technical 
system proposed by Nakamoto distributes power across a larger network that eliminates the need 
for traditional governance systems, as the infrastructure purports to replace systems of trust and 
relationships with anonymity and distributed power in an open source network. Enabling 
anonymity in the infrastructure through distributed governance was considered a crucial benefit 
derived from blockchain, as Nakamoto theorized that the lack of anonymity would create low 
barriers to entry, higher buy-in from stakeholders, and more efficient payment processing speeds 
(2).  
Bitcoin has since spawned new types of cryptocurrencies based on the blockchain, 
leading to a robust and competitive market. As of 2018, there are over one thousand 
cryptocurrencies in existence; Bitcoin remains the largest by market capitalization, peaking at a 
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value of nearly $20,000 per coin in late 2017, and has since fallen to around $9,000 in 2018 
(Kharpal “Cryptocurrencies are heading for a 90 percent correction in ‘mass market wipe out,’ 
investment bank warns”). The most viable competitor that has emerged to Bitcoin is Ethereum, a 
cryptocurrency that is executed under a system of smart contracts (discussed in further detail in 
this paper’s analysis), an infrastructure that represents a stark divergence from the original 
Bitcoin framework. The novel value proposition of cryptocurrency has also generated a 
significant amount of investor interest in the growth of the industry. Meanwhile, the blockchain 
infrastructure itself has been widely applied to a number of industries, including financial 
services, healthcare, and entertainment (Olleros and Zhegu ed. 243).  
 
Issues of Governance in Cryptocurrency 
The technical infrastructure Nakamoto outlined for Bitcoin implies a non-technical 
governance structure with different actors. The nature of the system itself distributes technical 
power, forming the basis for decentralized governance. The cryptocurrency system is defined by 
several key stakeholders that each carry a crucial function: users, who choose to send and receive 
payments on the blockchain network; miners, who both verify transactions and mine new coins 
at a preordained rate set by the system to keep the money supply consistent; developers, who 
create and update the system; and finally, external stakeholders, such as nonprofit foundations, 
wallets, and currency exchanges, that affect the funding and development of cryptocurrency. The 
promise of cryptocurrency thus fundamentally does not entirely eliminate governance, but 
redefines it from traditional employer/employee or contractual relationships toward trustless, 
virtual interactions that attempt to reduce the existence of formal governance structures.  
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One explicit way that non-technical governance is addressed and alluded to in the Bitcoin 
White Paper is through Nakamoto’s discussion on miner attacks. As a whole, he considers the 
system tamper proof because each block of transactions contains a hash of the previous block; 
attempting to change, for example, the unique hash or timestamp server of a transaction would 
be caught almost immediately by other miner nodes. However, he identifies instances in which 
miners may not behave as expected by the system in order to gain advance rights to mining. 
Another potential issue he identifies is unintential forking, or the creation of multiple transaction 
recording blockchains, usually caused by delayed signaling due to network latency and traffic. 
Nakamoto contends that although multiple blockchains will temporarily be created, miners will 
be incentivized to add only to the longest chain. Nakamoto also addresses types of miner attacks 
that could occur, but emphasizes that when the majority of miners are “honest”, or mine 
according to protocol, the entire system runs smoothly. These attacks, along with the rise of 
different mining groups, will be discussed in subsequent Bitcoin specific analysis, but their 
inclusion in the White Paper itself implies that Nakamoto was considering aspects of governance 
in the creation of Bitcoin (6).  
Furthermore, despite the novelty of cryptocurrency’s technical infrastructure, recent 
developments indicate that governance may play a larger role than anticipated by cryptocurrency 
creators. Four primary areas, examined in further detail in the ensuing paragraphs, are 
particularly salient: the multitude of currency forks; emerging private cryptocurrencies 
reevaluating the very value proposition of Bitcoin and imposing centralized governance systems; 
the involvement of the SEC in regulating cryptocurrency; and finally, investor interest and 
financing mechanisms surrounding cryptocurrency introducing the notion of external influence 
on governance systems.  
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Currency forks occur when there is a fundamental disagreement about a technical 
characteristic in a cryptocurrency, leading to the creation of a new digital infrastructure (Gervais, 
Karame, Capkun and Capkun 4-5). There are two primary classifications of currency forks. Soft 
forks can be made to a software upgrade that cause a temporary split in the blockchain; these 
changes are usually non-controversial and implemented by majority, and transition quickly as 
nodes, who vote to improve the system, simply upgrade to the new system and mine on the new 
chain instead. Soft forks have the advantage of being able to apply to previous transactions 
seamlessly, making them reverse compatible (Liew and Hewlett 2017, 5). In contrast, hard forks 
represent a permanent split from the original blockchain that occurs when there are conflicts 
about fundamental issues in the underlying system (Liew and Hewlett 5). Hard forks require all 
nodes to upgrade: thus, if a majority of nodes do not choose to adopt the new system, and two 
independent cryptocurrencies begin to operate on separate system. Meanwhile, users and miners 
can only operate on one since they are incompatible (Liew and Hewlett 5). The rise in the 
number of currency forks in recent years brings into question the stability of cryptocurrency and 
has drawn attention to governance, especially decision rights; who has the right to initiate or 
approve forks and to what extent forks are beneficial for the users of cryptocurrency. 
 One of the key value propositions from Nakamoto’s original paper was the anonymity 
associated with cryptocurrency, and its open source infrastructure to encourage widespread 
adoption as a mode of payment. However, many investors have recently begun to call this 
anonymity into question. While each user employs a private key to encode his or her 
transactions, the public availability of all transactions on a ledger theoretically could allow for 
someone to trace multiple transactions back to the same individual (Tennant 2017, 1). One 
solution that has been developed to this issue is “mixing”, a process by which users form 
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collectives to mix up the coins they transact with in order to prevent any transactions to be traced 
back to a single individual (Tennant 1). Leading cryptocurrencies have also been adopting 
private networks to further combat the issue of security (Olleros and Zhegu 2016, 231). These 
networks differ fundamentally both amongst cryptocurrencies and from the original 
infrastructure proposed by Nakamoto. The emergence of these structures brings about questions 
referring to the changing value proposition of cryptocurrencies and the governance systems that 
are now being employed to support them.  
 The questions surrounding the legal viability of cryptocurrency have been promulgated 
around the world in the last several years. Recently, the SEC has moved to define cryptocurrency 
as a security, and imposed regulations on cryptocurrency exchange (Michaels 2018). This brings 
into question the potential of the SEC to classify cryptocurrency as a security, which in turn 
would lead to the potential for capital gains tax. External questions about the viability of 
cryptocurrency are closely tied to the internal regulation of the systems; who is in charge, how 
can security breaches be compensated, and how are shareholders protected. The next several 
years will see heightened attention drawn to the internal governance of cryptocurrency, and will 
force these systems themselves to rethink how they approach internal governance. 
 Most visibly, cryptocurrency has gained widespread public notoriety and attention in the 
investor market. Heightened awareness of cryptocurrency has resulted in extreme price volatility. 
The price of Bitcoin, for example, peaked at nearly $20,000 in late 2017, and has declined over 
50% in 2018 (Adkisson 2018). Ethereum has also appreciated 5000% in value since the 
beginning of the year (Coinbase 2018). While some industry experts speculate that the rapid 
price increase in cryptocurrency represents a temporary bubble, other investors are clamoring for 
the novel technology and in the power of consensus for the wide use of cryptocurrency. This 
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interest has also led to the integration of cryptocurrency with financial markets, introducing 
cryptocurrency to a whole host of investors and contingent factors. Bitcoin Futures have recently 
debuted to high prices, allowing investors to speculate on the price of coins without owning the 
currency (Reuters 2017). Given that the internal governance of cryptocurrency is highly geared 
toward aligning stakeholder interest through ownership of the currency, this new development 
poses new risks for the correlation between speculation and actual cryptocurrency value due to 
potential external influence (Pauw 2017). Finally, the increase in visibility of cryptocurrency has 
called into question how investors should evaluate the different types of cryptocurrency available 
in the market and how governance structure will play into long-term success.  
 The technical premise of cryptocurrency, along with these four recent trends, seem to 
indicate that the non-technical attributes of cryptocurrency warrant further analysis. This idea 
seems to be promulgated among the cryptocurrencies as well. Specifically, the interplay between 
the non-technical interactions of economic actors within the cryptocurrency governance system 
and the technical system itself creates a space for further analysis.  
 
RESEARCH QUESTION: 
 Nakamoto’s thesis for cryptocurrency outlines a technical structure that is built on the 
notion of decentralization. However, he simultaneously sets the stage for a rich non-technical 
ecosystem that exists to support the technical infrastructure. Given the unique nature of 
cryptocurrency and how relatively little attention has been paid to its non-technical attributes, 
this paper will examine to what extent the promise of technology mitigates governance by 
analyzing what strategies of governance Bitcoin and Ethereum have put in place. Specifically, 
this paper aims to relate the technical value proposition of each currency to understand whEther 
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aspects of traditional governance are successfully circumnavigated or replicated. In effect, the 
research question this paper aims to answer is: what strategies of governance are in place for 
cryptocurrencies? It hypothesizes that cryptocurrency’s technical infrastructure does not 
effectively lessen the need for formal governance; the development of non-technical governance 
structures are inevitable in cryptocurrency. Furthermore, this paper finds that non-technical 
attributes of governance, specifically trust and intrinsic motivation, are, in fact, crucial to the 
successful utilization of cryptocurrency and that further attention should be paid to how these 
structures are put in place. 
 In defining the scope of the research question, this paper will focus on the two largest 
cryptocurrencies, Bitcoin and Ethereum; this choice was consciously made to ensure that there 
would be sufficient information and development of governance structures for analysis across 
two different technical structures. While there are a number of governance issues that have 
surrounded cryptocurrencies from outside legal entities, including their status and allowance by 
the SEC, and the dubious legality of initial coin offerings (ICOs) as funding mechanisms, this 
paper focuses exclusively on the impact of governance structures internal to each 
cryptocurrency. One of the reasons for this is the international nature of cryptocurrency itself has 
resulted in inconsistent external policy that has not yet provided a space for meaningful analysis.  
 
OVERVIEW OF GOVERNANCE THEORY:  
At a basic level, governance refers to the rules that manage the actions of any type of 
entity (Rezaee 2009, 17). The goal of governance is to create a system of checks and balances to 
enhance overall shareholder value while simultaneously protecting the interests of all 
stakeholders (30). Governance thus functions to curb the potential powers of different groups of 
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actors who have stake in the firm. The theoretical foundation of governance depicts the types of 
outcomes that are predicted by the analysis of the behavior of actors within a firm, and how types 
of transactions define firm and governance structures.  In addition to providing a short overview 
of classical governance theory, and its shift toward behavioral explanations, this section explores 
the emergence of open source software programs and the governance structures they have 
implemented to better understand what aspects of traditional governance technology has begun 
to minimize  
Governance theory emerged to explain and provide alternative structures to contracting, 
which exists as the most common and salient alternative to enforce rules. A contract is legally 
enforceable agreement between two or more parties (Werbach 2015, 315). Generally, according 
to Grossman and Hart (1986) governance is considered more advantageous than contracting 
when the roles of stakeholders are clearly defined and there are multiple contributors or joint 
ownership of a resource, leading to less predictable ex post outcomes that can be accurately 
contracted at efficient costs ex ante (718). Contracts thus create a tradeoff by imposing specific 
monetary consequences to curb malicious action, but also require costs of enforcement.   The 
definition of “contracting” has also come to include “implicit” contracts in addition to 
traditionally observed explicit formal contracts. Klein et al. (1978) define implicit contracts as a 
“guarantee enforced by the market mechanism of withdrawing future business if opportunistic 
behavior occurs” (303). Implicit contracts occur when the advantage of joint ownership is 
decreased relative to economizing on contracting costs necessary to insure non-opportunistic 
behavior (299). In effect, governance and implicit contracts rely on the complex and often 
interrelated behaviors of multiple individuals, given that contracting is a viable option. A central 
theme in governance is simultaneously offering incentives for good behavior (e.g. behavior that 
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works toward the overall goal) while placing restriction on negative behavior to ensure task 
completion at ultimate efficiency.  Governance is also only considered useful as long as it is 
effective relative to alternative incentive structures. 
Early governance theory serves to demonstrate that systems of governance or contracting 
emerge to enforce relationships associated with economic activity, and are viewed as necessary 
only for particular transactions. Central to corporate governance theory is the characterization of 
the firm: how and why it comes into being, what properties it naturally contains, and why it 
represents an efficient structure of governance. The first work to delineate the characteristics that 
define different types of firm governance was Ronald Coase’s “The Nature of the Firm” in 1937. 
Coase (1937) posited that firms were centralizing authorities that existed to economize the cost 
of coordinating economic activity, as dependent on both the costs of organizing and the 
efficiency of the coordination (390). Coase also characterized the idea of “agency” costs, or 
finding a transaction type and incentive structure that could minimize the negative actions of a 
manager, or residual claimant to firm value (395). Coase defined the costs of transacting across a 
number of dimensions, including search costs, bargaining costs, and enforcement costs that could 
be used to assess alternative actions of stakeholders in cryptocurrency (396-7). To Coase, 
centralization naturally implied stricter and more costly types of governance that were only 
relevant for certain types of market transactions (394). In essence, not every type of transaction 
required a firm, and therefore governance.  
Oliver Williamson built upon Coase’s landmark findings in his theory of transaction cost 
economics.  Specifically, Williamson (1979) argued that certain dimensions of a transaction 
dictate the structure of governance that should surround it (244). He determined that transaction 
costs are naturally higher in contexts with high uncertainty, low frequency, and high asset 
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specificity; in effect, costs are defined on dimensions of whether transactions are predictable and 
skill specific to both the firm and its economic actors (239). Williamson also theorized that the 
time horizon of a transacting relationship also had important implications for governance, as it 
increased potential transaction costs and required greater stakeholder incentive in the system 
(251). This language will be used to describe the tradeoffs made by stakeholders in 
cryptocurrency in subsequent analysis. Together, Coase and Williamson created a basis for 
governance theory that serves as a way to control and motivate individuals acting toward a 
common goal. Understanding the types of transactions and the roles or functions required to 
achieve the end goals are crucial in shaping a governance structure that allows for specific 
characteristics of the exchange, including its asset specificity and time horizon. Additionally, 
actors are motivated to work within a governance system, as opposed to a contractual obligation 
for which there are legal ramifications if not followed, given their own limitations, namely 
opportunism and bounded rationality, as well as the costs they incur of completing the 
transaction relative to other actions. Thus ultimately governance theory is built around human 
behavior, leading to subsequent analysis from Williamson and James March on the varying 
composition of the firm in relation to actor incentives.  
The link between transaction costs and incentive structures to Williamson (1979) was 
determined by two key constraints on economic actors: opportunism, self interest with guile, and 
bounded rationality, inherent information asymmetries in the knowledge of economic actors. 
Williamson then argued that the unintentional effects of bounded rationality led individuals to 
behave opportunistically to the detriment of the firm (241). Thus, Williamson argued that 
organizations should economize on bounded rationality while limiting stakeholder opportunism 
to create the most potential value (245-6). This idea was also reflected in Alchian and Demsetz’ 
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(1972) analysis of employee incentives. The authors’ main finding was that when individual 
output was difficult to directly observe and benefits were collectively born, but costs were born 
individually, individual contracting was costly and ineffective (777). Two distinct problems, 
those surrounding metering and shirking incentives amongst workers in a group, characterized 
whether hierarchy, and thus a firm structure, arose. Alchian and Demsetz also characterized a 
“residual claimant” who is incentivized by ownership to contribute and accurate monitor 
production (783). Williamson ultimately theorized that actors within a firm are constrained by 
their bounded rationality and self-interest through opportunism, indicating that the formal 
structure of governance should reflect behavioral elements of actors rather than the distinctive 
nature of the transaction. 
In his seminal essay “The Business Firm as a Political Coalition”, James March (1962) 
moved beyond describing the behavioral motivations of individual action from Williamson to 
impute game theory models of conflict resolution onto firm decision-making. He began by 
noting that traditional models of firm theory that treat individuals within a firm as units with 
discrete interests that come together to maximize their joint preference have nearly always been 
disproved (669). He then argued that the imputation of a superordinate goal (most commonly 
profit maximization) as the driving force for firm activities was a facetious lens into firm 
decision making (670). Instead, he applied political theory frameworks that viewed actors within 
a firm as different interest groups that make various demands on the system (671). In March's 
model. each coalition has potential control over the system, mirroring the natural divergence of 
interests among actors in the firm. He ultimately argued that these conflict systems required a 
centralized "politician" to both mediate conflict by ordering the coalitions by viability and 
importance (e.g. maximize resource use within the firm) (672). He wrote that the goals and 
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composition of a firm are negotiated and bargained in the pursuit of hierarchically organizing 
these interests (672). In determining that superordinate goals did not in fact exist, March argued 
that governance by centralization was a natural tendency of the firm, a fact that had been ignored 
in viewing the firm as a fixed construct. This occurred naturally as actor interests shifted 
overtime and therefore shifted firm goals to align with them.  
Building on his theory of transaction cost economics, Williamson (1993) determined that 
exogenous factors in the firm that arise as a result of relationships can have profound impact on 
the effectiveness of the structure. He asserted that trust based systems exist differently in the 
presence of contractual safeguards, placing heightened importance on the systems in which 
contracts are embedded within (476). He defined trust as “the risk one takes depend[ing] on the 
performance of another actor” which was undertaken “when the expected gain from placing 
oneself at risk to another is positive, but not otherwise” (463). Trustworthiness implies 
cooperation with potential, net-neutral penalty rather than a fixed financial reward guiding one’s 
actions. The conditions for trust according to Williamson (stemming from Dasgupta) were as 
follows: individuals must have repeated encounters and memory of previous experiences; there 
must be a cost to honest behavior; and finally, reputation must have stake within the system, 
(466). Trust thus required relationships between actors to form in order to exist. Williamson built 
on his writing on the contextual factors of transaction types to include the concept of institutional 
environments, calling for further specification in the types of governance systems employed. In 
effect, he theorized that institutional environments provided safeguards against undesirable 
behavior to varying degrees that characterized further the types of transactions being conducted 
(476). Additionally, culture plays a large role in defining institutional environments, and serves 
as a check on opportunism by imposing social conditioning on the acts of members of a 
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particular institutional environment. Strong cultures increase the potency of social sanctions and 
remorse on the part of an individual with malicious intentions, which makes organizations more 
effective (476). Institutional environments are often maintained by the upkeep of social accounts 
that become ineffective when turned into financial or legal obligations; as such, Williamson 
wrote that “there are some transactions for which the optimal level of conscious metering is 
zero” (481). He defined personal trust by the absence of monitoring, favorable preferences, and 
discreteness amongst individuals; in effect personal trust fosters greater alignment between 
individuals and organizations (483-4). Through these arguments, Williamson demonstrated that 
contracting is impaired when institutional factors already incentivize certain types of behavior, 
further indicating that trust and other non-institutionalized factors actually play a huge role in the 
overall effectiveness of a governance structure. In effect he theorized that trust is an inevitable 
source of governance enhancement. 
 Together, the arguments of Williamson and March introduce a new concept of 
governance that is based around its actors alone: that people are influenced by one another and 
their social structures, and as this happens, their interests relative to one another change, forcing 
the governance structures themselves to change. The implications that the firm derives its 
activity based on actors’ interests inherently means that its composition, and therefore 
governance structure, will always inevitably change. The superordinate goal is in fact to adapt to 
the incentives and behaviors of the actors within the system, because, as both March and 
Williamson assert, actors in the system will always advance their own agenda without regard for 
firm processes.  
March’s characterization also brought to light the key role of decision rights within the 
firm. Decision rights refer to the systems, constraints, and roles that firms use in decision making 
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(Athey and Roberts 2001, 200). March compared the decision rights structure of the firm to the 
influence of interest groups on political coalitions, with competing resource and interest 
offerings defining their abilities to perform tasks effectively and defines governance as a series 
of conflict resolution techniques (671). He noted that the demands actors make in a political 
system shift in response to experience within the system, and the perception of problems they 
might face (673). Goals and decisions in the firm thus appeared to be paired but decentralized. 
Athey and Roberts have added to this analysis by characterizing decision rights in the non-
classical firm. The design of incentive schemes and decision rights structures are inevitably 
interlinked, as the means of affected a specific behavior usually result in offering incentives for 
alternative behaviors; the incentives for effort and for decisions are inextricably tied together 
(200). In effect, decision rights constitutes yet another behavior that motivates governance 
structure by reflecting constituent interest. The collective bargaining that occurs in the very 
creation of the firm also occurs at the level of decision rights, when future outcomes are 
measured by the utility of each individual actor.  
Given cryptocurrency’s reliance on blockchain as a technical interface to act as 
governance, this paper would be remiss if it did not explore new types of governance structures 
that have emerged to reflect the ability of technology to facilitate decentralized communication. 
Crucial to the analysis of cryptocurrency is the rise of community-based governance, a system 
that has emerged in the context of open source software (OSS), development communities with 
decentralized contribution schemes. The typical stakeholder structure of open source projects is 
analogous to many cryptocurrencies, and can help parse which contributors should and can have 
the rights to the decision rights structure. As Siobhan O’Mahony (2007) notes, although the term 
open source software (OSS) seems to implicate free access for contributors, most successful OSS 
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projects have structured governance systems, including formal leadership roles, representative 
decision making, and funding from nonprofit foundations (140). This governance structure 
mirrors closely the relationship between developers, users, and miners in the cryptocurrency 
stakeholder infrastructure. At a high level, the intricacy of governance in OSS implies a similar 
structure could be required for cryptocurrency given the task of balancing multiple contributors, 
and indicates that the behavioral components of governance.  
As governance theory predicts, the structures of governance in OSS stem directly from 
contributor incentives. For example, most OSS encourages development from multiple sources 
but restricts access to the code base, usually to only founding members or “executives”; 
structuring levels of restricted membership around joint production serves to limit a singular 
actor’s interest in the scope of the larger community (147). Decision-making authority in 
community governance is thus sometimes constructed in a hierarchy from community-approved 
improvements to complex code level decisions (147). Sonali K. Shah’s (2006) research on 
hybrid OSS development similarly finds that the governance structure of a system affects 
participation (1000). In addition to decision rights, Shah also found that property rights and 
ownership of information remained crucial to initiating buy in, noting “the creation of a neutral 
and accessible commons is crucial for fostering community-based innovation” in the absence of 
face to face relationships (1011). The neutrality of the commons is constructed by the 
governance system and its managers in order to curb opportunism. Yochai Benkler (2003), a 
renowned scholar in the field of internet governance, notes that social systems “tremendous 
investment, acculturation, and maintenance” (110). He described that “social transactional 
frameworks are likely to be substantially less expensive than market transactions for pooling 
large number of discrete, small increments of the excess capacity from the perspective of the 
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contributors” (116). He also characterized two key components of peer sharing models: 
modularity, the property of a project that describes the extent to which it can be broken down 
into smaller components that can be independently produced before assembled; and granularity, 
the size modules in terms of the time and effort that an individual must invest in producing them 
(110). This mirrors the way that individuals approach work in the firm, by the size and effort 
required to earn incentive. Community based governance in OSS has no clear superordinate goal 
unless imposed by its participants, and thus requires intrinsic motivation for participation, rather 
than financial incentive. Rather than removing the need for trust, this in fact increases the 
strength of relationships among people on the network whose shared interest is entirely 
voluntary.  
Thus, OSS exemplifies the impact of technology on traditional theories of governance. It 
decreases communication and search costs among actors and facilitates decentralized joint 
production for outputs that are separable. Communities that are able to forge trust-based 
relationships through repeated interaction and reputation thrive despite lacking typical 
transacting relationships. Decision rights in the absence of physical community takes on a new 
level of heightened awareness for relationship-building. The implication for open source 
software is despite the ability to work in a decentralized manner, governance structures are still 
richly visible to underlie the technical infrastructure. In the end, it appears that technology does 
not eliminate the need for governance as long as joint contributions are the key outcome. Since 
actors are always innovating to increase their position relative to a firm, the behavioral basis for 
their actions surrounding joint production seem to necessitate some form of governance, an idea 
that will be explored further in the analysis of cryptocurrency. 
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ANALYSIS 
Bitcoin 
 As the first cryptocurrency, Bitcoin introduced the typical system of technical governance 
described in the introduction. This section will examine the non-technical attributes of the 
current governance structure of Bitcoin, through the lens of incentive structures and decision 
rights of the major participants. In order to analyze the incentive structures within governance of 
Bitcoin, this paper will primarily look at the two stakeholder groups with the largest amounts of 
power, developers and miners, while also giving a brief overview of the influence potential of 
external groups and users.  
Developers hold a range of incentives for participating in the Bitcoin network: some 
developers view their contributions to Bitcoin as volunteer work, while others are sponsored by 
private businesses to take part (Wirdum 2016). This follows Benkler’s analysis that because opt 
in for open source projects is entirely voluntary, the choice to contribute is colored by intangible 
gains from a social transaction, such as social standing and recognition (96). Bitcoin does not 
establish a strict hierarchy of contributing developers, which seems to be common practice in 
OSS, but the system does differentiate between the incentive structures for ordinary contributors 
and core developers. Core developers have the distinction of holding the Bitcoin source code, 
and are seen as both the de facto internal and external leaders of the organization (BitcoinCore 
2018, “Team”). Core developers on the Bitcoin system are tasked with improving its software. 
As stated on the official Bitcoin Foundation website developers “can’t force a change in protocol 
because all users are free to choose what software and version they use. In order to stay 
compatible with each other, all users need to use software complying with the same rules. 
Bitcoin can only work correctly with a complete consensus among all users” (Bitcoin.org 2018, 
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“FAQ”). Thus, core developers hold “commit access” to merge new software proposals that 
invoke community agreement with the system. They are compensated through the Bitcoin 
Foundation, a nonprofit entity that “coordinates the efforts of the members of the Bitcoin 
community, helping to create awareness of the benefits of Bitcoin, how to use it and its related 
technology requirements, for technologists, regulators, the media and everyone else globally” 
(The Bitcoin Foundation 2018, “About” ). Modeled off of the Linux Foundation, a nonprofit 
corporation that supports the development of many open source projects, the Bitcoin Foundation 
engages in activities such as organizing conferences, funding protocol development, political 
lobbying, and administering research grants (The Bitcoin Foundation 2018, “About”). It chiefly 
deals with developers, and follows Nakamoto’s original goals closely in order to promote 
creative development to further the currency. Contributing developers are often well known in 
OSS, and are not explicitly contracted anywhere on the platform; as mentioned above, most are 
externally compensated, if at all.  
 The governance structure within the Bitcoin Foundation has also undergone tumultuous 
change, with many directors quitting and the Foundation declaring bankruptcy on multiple 
occasions since its inception in 2009. As a result, Bitcoin Foundation has since sought more 
consistent funding from a few primary sources, among them the MIT Digital Currency Initiative, 
an interdisciplinary research laboratory that intends to provide a neutral academic working 
environment for developers, to fund their salaries.  The organization employs core developers to 
further research into blockchain and applications to financial inclusions, and other technology 
companies that have a stake in the improvement of blockchain (Wirdum). For example, 
Blockstream, a for-profit technology company, employs developers in Bitcoin. To align their 
incentives, Blockstream developers have time-locked Bitcoins to ensure they are incentivized to 
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work toward Bitcoin’s success. Their contracts also include “morality clauses”: if Blockstream 
asks any of them to work against what they consider to be in Bitcoin’s best interest, they can 
refuse to do so while still guaranteed a salary (Wirdum) Rather than putting up a significant 
amount of money to fund development, the Initiative relies on compiling unrestricted gifts from 
sponsors, such as mining experts and high net worth individuals, who may in turn be funded by 
venture capitalists and other larger institutional investors (Wirdum).  In order to combat the 
perceived conflict of interest, the developers are said to have complete freedom over their work, 
including retaining the ability to research alternative currency implementations (e.g. a core 
developer named Gavin Andresen’s work and proposal for a hard fork of Bitcoin came out of his 
efforts in paid research at the Initiative) (Wirdum). These systems seem to curb systematic 
opportunism among developers, although the implications of doing “research” on blockchain 
does not necessarily always align with the time sensitive code decisions core developers are 
often tasked to make.  Thus the Bitcoin Foundation appears to be accepting of any type of 
development in the area of Bitcoin improvement, regardless of whEther developers are working 
toward their own motivations or toward the betterment of the specific system.  
Unlike the majority of the Bitcoin network that remains decentralized (both spatially and 
computationally), the core developers of Bitcoin seem to retain close knit ties. The few who have 
the privilege of holding commit access do seem to have rampant opportunities to act in their own 
self interest; however, the balance of core developers on the system ensures that malicious action 
taken by any single developer would immediate result in his or her expulsion and a revocation of 
their commit access (Lombrozo 2017) For example, Gavin Andresen’s continued attempts to 
initiate forks led the core development team to remove his access rights because they believed he 
was not acting to the benefit of the Bitcoin community.  
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The use of the Bitcoin Foundation to coordinate the funding for Bitcoin also calls into 
question the purpose and the typical governance structures of nonprofit foundations. In effect, 
nonprofits’ purposes are inherently non-monetary; as a result, trust, intrinsic motivation, and 
strong networks are the biggest drivers of nonprofit actions. Centered around mission and 
ideology, nonprofits do not typically rely on stakeholder incentives. This insinuates that a 
potential power overreach by, for example, members of the board of the Bitcoin Foundation might 
have disruptive consequences in that the system itself is built on trust while the surrounding 
technology deliberately avoid these networks.  
Much like contributing developers, the users of Bitcoin encompass a wide variety of 
individuals who buy into the currency with different purposes. Investors in Bitcoin are often 
individuals, rather than institutions, and have shown to be predominantly male (Leinz 2018). 
Crucially, a strong investing pool in Bitcoin occurs from non-technology oriented, libertarian 
groups that believe in the power of Bitcoin as an alternative to traditional government issued 
currency (Leinz). It can be inferred that users also buy into Bitcoin in order to profit off of the 
growth of the technology. Recent developments have also allowed the trade of Bitcoin financial 
instruments on the market, leading a wider variety of people to become exposed to the volatility 
of the currency. The composition of ownership in Bitcoin varies, but it is well known that several 
individuals hold a significant proportion of the currency (e.g. the Winklevoss twins and 
Nakamoto) (Pollack 2017). Users contribute to the governance of Bitcoin primarily through 
online message boards, where many users have developed significant discourse surrounding 
important issues related to Bitcoin, including the fork (Bitcoin.org, “Community”).  
In contrast to the visibility of many developers in Bitcoin, miners’ identities are 
necessarily shrouded in secrecy; they comprise diverse communities of programmers across the 
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world (Bitcoin Magazine, “What is Bitcoin Mining?”) . As stated previously, miners have two 
primary functions within the Bitcoin ecosystem: to approve transactions and to mine new coins. 
Miners are incentivized by compensation from each of those two activities: receiving transaction 
fees from transactors and by holding coins as a store of value. Most Bitcoin miners view it as a 
full time job, and owing to systematic differences between types of cryptocurrency, they 
typically only mine Bitcoin, or Bitcoin offshoots called altcoins (Bitcoin Magazine, “What is An 
Altcoin?”) In examining whEther miner incentives are aligned with that of Bitcoin as a whole, 
most attention will be directed to these two forms of compensation, and whEther they are 
mutually satisfying for miner goals.  
The rise of mining pools, or coordinated groups of miners that split the benefits of mining 
equally among themselves, poses several problems for the technical integrity of the system (Eyal 
and Sirer 2013, 437). Mining pools have arisen in order to combine hashrate power amongst 
groups of individuals to be able to receive the highest transaction fees and mine the greatest 
number of blocks (437).  There are several distinct advantages to mining in pools: it results in 
guaranteed payments; it results in a greater concentration of payments, because the combined 
hashrate speed ensures that the pool will mine more coins; finally, miners in third party pools do 
not need to be connected to the entire Bitcoin blockchain, a factor that tends to make their 
processing feeds much more quick (StackExchange 2014, “How do mining pools work?”).  . The 
third party miners are connected to the Bitcoin network through the administrator of the pool, 
who functions as a full Bitcoin node (StackExchange 2014, “How do mining pools work?”).  . 
Administrators solve metering and shirking potential amongst members within the mining pool 
by having them solve a hash that is not nearly as difficult as it would be on the network. This 
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ensures that miners will work to mine new blocks in third party entities (StackExchange 2014, 
“How do mining pools work?”).  
The rapid concentration of power in Bitcoin puts the network at risk for intentioned miner 
attacks due to the attractiveness of opting into pools. Mining pools have also effectively made it 
impossible to mine as an individual; as pools become the predominant source of mining, power 
concentrates in the hands of few organizations that could undermine the system due to competing 
interests. Mining pools are responsible for mining and synthesizing new blocks of transactions; 
thus, their acceptance of rules is essential in order that the new types of blocks and transactions 
can actually be added to the blockchain. As Benkler notes, “The number of people who can, in 
principle participate in a project is therefore inversely related to the size of the smallest-scale 
contribution necessary to produce a usable module”, indicating that as the crucial function of 
mining becomes more important and require a larger investment of time, the universe of 
potential miners decreases, leading to increased accumulation of power in mining pools (101). In 
addition to aggregating computing power, miners can also cause adverse effects on the system 
itself through pools. Conti, Lal, and Ruj (2017) identify eight different types of major attacks on 
the PoW based consensus protocol in Bitcoin that are amplified by mining pools. These include: 
double spending, or spending the same bitcoins on multiple transactions; privately mining on 
blockchain fork; and block withholding attacks. Many of the types of attacks are facilitated by 
mining pools in order to drive individual minors and to weaken the consensus protocol of PoW 
(Eyal and Sirer 438). The types of attacks that mining pools can conduct are more lethal if they 
accumulate a majority of the hashrate on the network, which would contradict Nakamoto’s 
vision that miner attacks would be safeguarded through distributed governance. Recent data 
indicates that 65% of the hashrate of the Bitcoin network is contained by five dominant mining 
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cartels, increasing the chance of malicious activity (Rosic 2018). The question then becomes: 
why haven’t these pools launched a coordinated attack? While there have not been any definitive 
answers for why that is the case, one widely speculated explanation is that attacks would provide 
power only in a limited time frame. The long term implications of a 51% attack might include 
being shunned from the system by other members and tanking the price of the cryptocurrency, 
which could have adverse effect on the selfish miners. (Eyal and Sirer 452)  In a sense this poses 
a transaction cost for malicious mining. To prevent these types of attacks, core developers of 
Bitcoin have been relatively successful in the guidance they provide through the Bitcoin 
Foundations to users through the community; Gavin Andresen has written to urge miners to 
transfer to smaller, decentralized mining pools, which might in fact result in higher PoW costs 
for miners (Cawrey 2014). In articles and commentary surrounding Bitcoin, many appeal to 
“Bitcoin purists” who should act for the integrity of the network, regardless of the cost structures 
in place (Bitcoin.org, “Community”). Thus, it seems that the ideology of Bitcoin has been 
successful in preventing power overreach.  
Mining pools seem to arise because of the combined hashrate power they provide in 
block creation (Eyal and Sirer 437). Meanwhile, these pools demonstrate a more formalized 
governance system. The structure of mining pools itself implies a single residual claimant who 
distributes coins to participants according to the work they contribute. The behavior of this single 
person is unregulated, except through implicit contracting within the pool, and yet this individual 
holds a significant amount of power in the way that money is produced in the system, which 
underlies almost all actions that can be taken on it and any transactions that can be conducted. In 
effect, miners have established a centralized system, having internally determined that the cost of 
metering is far less than the aggregate power acquired from having a monitor.  
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 Miners’ second mode of compensation is through transaction fees that are added on top 
of any coin transaction between two users at the discretion of the initiating party. The fees are 
not standardized and comprise a wide range that correlates to the value of the transaction to the 
transacting party. This poses a significant problem for the future of the Bitcoin ecosystem for 
two primary reasons: first, that it gives miners inordinate control over the system, and second, 
because it subverts Nakamoto’s intentions for Bitcoin. If miners are compensated for the tasks 
that underlie the system, they can effectively choose which transactions to complete based on the 
fee attached, resulting in increasingly high transaction fees in order to use the system. There is 
evidence that this is already happening; transaction with low fees are known to suffer from 
starvation, when miners deny the transaction service because the opportunity cost of other 
transactions is too high (Conti et. al. 4). Given that Nakamoto advocated for Bitcoin to solve the 
issue of paying third party processors for transactions, it seems antithetical to the system itself 
that transaction fees will be a valid mode of compensation for miners moving forward. 
Furthermore, because the block size is fixed, transactions will naturally become expensive, and 
limit user profitability in the types of payments a few types of transactions such as settlement 
transactions between financial intermediaries, while transactions representing everyday 
purchases will get pushed off the main network into “side chains” or off-chain payment 
channels, and ultimately become more obscure (Conti et al. 32).  
Miners’ incentives to create new coins when the overall money supply has a finite 
capacity presents another conundrum. Specifically the present and future interests of miners 
differ significantly. Present miners are focused on creating coins as quickly as possible in order 
reap maximal financial benefits. This is the dominant and necessary strategy because there is 
limited upside potential for miners due to the PoW mechanism becoming more and more 
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difficult every 2 weeks. Furthermore, the number of newly mined coins that are rewarded halves 
every 210,000 blocks (bitcoinwiki 2017, “Protocol rules”). However, future miners, as the 
supply of money nears its cap, will be more focused on transaction fees and will have little 
incentive to take on mining as a full time activity. The lower incentives could result in lower 
difficulty than what the public desires from a security perspective, and might compromise the 
integrity of the system. This problem, defined by the economic conundrum “Tragedy of the 
Commons”, is an example of how bounded rationality manifests in Bitcoin, and has been widely 
regarded as a major threat facing the community (bitcoinwiki 2015, “Tragedy of the 
Commons”).  
The second key area of analysis within governance of cryptocurrency is the structure of 
decision making. Decision rights in the Bitcoin framework take on two primary functions: code 
changes and code forks. Code change approval requires developers to have control over a source 
code repository, and is enacted by core developers. This mechanism was controlled by 
Nakamoto, and subsequently by Gavin Andresen (after Nakamoto stepped down in 2011) 
(Simonite 2014). These privileges now lie in the hands of Bitcoin’s four major developers, who 
are entrusted with major administrative rights (De Filippi and Loveluck 6). Code change occurs 
at the discretion of these individuals; however, any Bitcoin or external stakeholder can submit a 
Bitcoin Improvement Proposal (BIP), a design document for introducing features or information 
to Bitcoin that provides technical specifications of the feature and rationale for its 
implementation (bitcoinwiki, “Bitcoin Improvement Proposals”). There are three primary types 
of BIPs: standards track BIPs, informational BIPs, and process BIPs. Standards track BIPs are 
generally the most impactful in the changes proposed and require community consensus. After 
core developers approve and consolidate the BIPs, they will put the proposal out to the 
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community; all members of the community (users, contributing developers, miners) have the 
opportunitiy to comment on it. The final vote is made primarily by miners who operate full 
functioning nodes by including a small piece of “voting code” in the blocks that they mine 
through PoW. The results are then broadcasted and then accepted or rejected. Generally, BIPs 
will achieve community approval before reaching the level of critical decision-making, which is 
examined in further detail in a later discussion on forks. The BIP process requires that all source 
code and documentation be released and made available to anyone, so that the entire community 
of individuals can discuss and improve them with subsequent proposals (De Filippi and 
Loveluck 2016, 13). The BIP process exemplifies the use of technology to minimize governance, 
although the ultimate enactment of the code change is put in the hands of core developers.   
 Bitcoin has experienced several forks that draw attention to the unique consensus 
formation it employs. Specifically, although the fork itself is created by software and ideological 
divergences among developers, miners ultimately choose what system to work on, analogous to 
“veto power” in shareholder votes. As explained by De Filippi and Loveluck, Bitcoin’s first fork, 
Bitcoin XT, occurred because of ideological differences on optimal block size: the limited block 
size of 1 MB allowed for the system to be stable and secure, but limited the number of 
transactions that could be processed at any given time (11). In addition to slowing transaction 
speeds for users, the block size also limited the upside potential of mining rewards, which, 
according to fork proponents, prevented the currency as a whole from scaling effectively (11). 
Those against block size increase cited the inclusivity and decentralization of the original 
proposed system as threatened because of the greater computing power needed to produce on 
larger blocks. According to some cryptographers, the increase in block size would also 
compromise the security of the network and delays in confirmation times (11). In August 2015, 
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two core developers of Bitcoin, Mike Hearn and Gavin Andresen, released Bitcoin XT, a 
variation of the Bitcoin software that increased the block size to 8 MB (roughly 24 transactions 
per second), with the cap on block size expected to double every two years (11). The system 
would require that 75% of 1,000 of the most recently mined blocks to be attributed to a system 
with the new block size (11). The new types of signature on Bitcoin XT would constitute a 
system that was then incompatible with the original Bitcoin. Bitcoin XT was well received upon 
its launch, and was run by 1,000 nodes.  The controversy surrounding the launch of Bitcoin XT, 
including online attacks and censorship of Bitcoin XT supporters within the Bitcoin community, 
ultimately led to low adoption rates among users and miners, and forced Hearn to resign in the 
wake of its failure. Andresen withdrew the XT BIP when it became clear that the currency was 
not going to gain acceptance over the original Bitcoin protocol, now termed Bitcoin Core, and its 
functionality was near dead by early 2016. This began a series of forks, including Bitcoin Classic 
in February 2016, which increased the block size to 2 MB to aim for a more market driven 
approach , and Bitcoin Unlimited (12).  
 As discussions about how and if Bitcoin should scale came to a head in late 2015, a 
second proposal, termed Segregated Witness (SegWit), was made by several core developers as a 
compromise to the increase in block size. SegWit would increase the effective block size by 
reducing the size of each individual transaction, a soft fork in Bitcoin Core rather than a hard 
fork (Torpey 2017). The decrease in transaction size would come from the removal of digital 
signatures that comprised over 60% of the entire Bitcoin blockchain. The first Segwit soft fork 
was approved almost universally by 95% of miners and activated in August 2017 (Torpey). 
However subsequent SegWit2x hard forks faced low approval from miners who faced very high 
opportunity costs from switching to the system (roughly the difference between mining fewer but 
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higher value blocks vs. more, lower value blocks) (Torpey). This was also because SegWit2x 
was capped at a 2GB blocksize (a seemingly arbitrary number), and due to difficulties in 
signaling actually indicating miner votes (Torpey).  
 Miner incentives within the decision to fork perhaps hold the greatest capacity to diverge 
from the overall good of the currency. For one, under Williamson’s theory, multiple Bitcoin 
forks lower switching and search costs for miners to seek rewards. This upside is also realized 
almost exclusively by mining pools: because the underlying hash algorithm for most Bitcoin 
altcoins is the same in all proposed forks, mining pools experience low switching costs, and will 
mine whichever currency is offering the highest potential reward at a given time. These profit 
switching mining pools both capture a significant amount of value across all currencies and also 
further push individual miners out of the system. Thus, mining pools have incentive to distort 
signaling effects, and keep as many coins in the market as possible. The precedent introduced by 
the first Bitcoin fork in 2015 has led to greater instability within the currency to find the optimal 
software, which also continually places miners in advantageous bargaining positions. The 
tradeoff between security and block size also strongly favors mining pools and makes the entire 
system more subject to selfish miner attacks and further manipulation.  
 The interplay between users and miners forms another basis for decision rights. In effect, 
miners’ consideration to signal for a fork is a function of the added complexity of the fork and 
user support. User support is largely determined by strong trust networks within the Bitcoin 
community. It is no accident that forks have been initiated by core developers, whose visibility 
and reputation enable trust more easily than external actors. Users are in turn influenced by 
external stakeholders, such as crypto focused funds and financial instruments that speculate 
about the currency. Meanwhile, because users often have less stake and knowledge of the 
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system, they tend to be risk averse against token volatility. Ultimately, if miners signal for a 
change on the system, greater community acceptance in using Bitcoin on the new system 
determine its “success”.  
The conditions for trust according to Williamson/Dasgupta were as follows: individuals must 
have repeated encounters and memory of previous experiences; there must be a cost to honest 
behavior; and finally, reputation must have stake within the system, (466). 
 In sum, Bitcoin’s technical infrastructure aims to eliminate third parties and complex 
transaction costs that are associated with bureaucratic elements of payment processing. Among 
the potential powers of the actors in the system, miners and developers hold the greatest capacity 
for opportunism, with miners forming powerful coalitions to dominate the computing power of 
the network and developers, especially those in the core and sponsored by the Bitcoin 
Foundation, gaining the ability to push their own personal vision of Bitcoin due to their high 
profile. Within decision rights, this may manifest in miners signaling votes for software changes 
that may not benefit the overall system. However, exempting the Bitcoin hard fork, the non-
technical governance of the system has been relatively stable. Relationships between individuals, 
especially among core developers and with the user and mining communities virtually, seem to 
form the basis of decision making in the absence of formal governance. 
Ethereum 
 The largest successor cryptocurrency that has emerged to Bitcoin is Ethereum, an open-
source public software platform that utilizes blockchain technology, and an independent 
cryptotoken, Ether. Ethereum’s own governance structure can be analyzed through examining its 
history as a direct descendant of Bitcoin, the incentives and decision rights systems it employs, 
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and two important historical events on the network: the movement to Proof of Stake (PoS) 
mining and the highly publicized hacking of “the DAO”.   
 Ethereum was first conceptualized in 2013 by Vitalik Buterin, an active developer in the 
Bitcoin community, who strove to apply blockchain technology to the creation of decentralized 
applications (Hertig). Its mission and goals are markedly different from that of Bitcoin. The 
creation of Ethereum reflected Buterin’s belief that Bitcoin’s technical infrastructure was 
underutilized. Specifically, in his landmark 2013 White Paper, Buterin proposed Ethereum as 
“the ultimate abstract foundational layer” that would allow users greater functionality in creating 
autonomous organizations, applications, and automatically executable contracts (Ethereum 
White Paper). The promise of Ethereum is thus centered around its functionality as a platform, 
rather than as a currency system.  
Ethereum employs a system of “smart contracts”, or digital assets that are controlled by a 
single piece of code when certain conditions (e.g. contractual obligations) are met (Ethereum 
White Paper). Buterin envisioned smart contracts as “autonomous agents” that lived within the 
Ethereum execution environment (Ethereum White Paper). The notion of smart contracts was 
first described by Nick Szabo in the late 1990s as a “proactively enforced form”, much like a 
vending machine that delivers an easily defined product for a specific amount of cash (Szabo 
1997, 1).  In short, smart contracts would ensure that all parties would not be able to change the 
terms of the contract once executed. The development of Ethereum accelerated after the 
foundation of smart contracts. In 2014, Gavin Wood, a computer science PhD who had 
researched blockchain, published the Ethereum Yellow Paper to further hone the technical 
specifications of the project. Wood introduced yet another dimension, termed Ethereum Virtual 
Machine (EVM), the runtime environment for Ether, and translated the first functional 
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implementation into seven programming languages (Wood 2015, 11). In structuring Ethereum as 
such, Wood and Buterin aimed to create a widely accessible platform for developers, which they 
hoped would cultivate a large community of like-minded followers. 
 As described in the Ethereum White Paper from 2015, which was initially authored by 
Buterin and has since been continuously updated and modified, Ethereum employs a technical 
system that resembles Bitcoin’s blockchain, but with several significant differences. Ethereum 
itself is made up of units, termed “accounts”, that can engage in “state transitions”, or transfers 
of value and information. This differs from Bitcoin, which utilizes unspent transaction outputs 
(UTXO) to conduct payments. The cryptotoken and source of value within Ethereum is termed 
“Ether”; Buterin envisioned Ether as a “fuel” for the system that powered internal transactions, 
rather than a distinct currency. He proposed two general types of accounts: externally owned 
accounts, which could execute only transactions; and contract accounts, which could be encoded 
to send transactions or create contracts. In addition to the sending and receiving address, each 
Ethereum transaction would contain specifications regarding the amount of Ether “gas” required 
to execute the transaction, as well as the fee to miners associated with the transaction. Unlike 
Bitcoin, where transaction fees are attached voluntarily to transactions to be processed, Ethereum 
would require fees to compensate miners for each execution on the network. The amount of gas 
associated with a transaction from an externally owned account (a non contractual account) 
would be directly correlated to the number of computational steps required for miners and users 
to complete the transaction, usually through the size of the transaction in bytes; this represents 
another departure from Bitcoin, where transaction fees are not required. Similarly, messages that 
originate from contract accounts could “call” another contract account, allowing different 
contracts to activate one another depending on the type of transaction desired. The amount of gas 
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specified for messages between contract accounts would extend over all desired actions begun on 
the chain. The contract’s code could either be run to completion or until the execution ran out of 
gas. From start to finish, a transaction would be first verified to make sure it had all necessary 
components, before a miner could transfer the transaction value from the sender’s account to the 
receiver’s while taking a transaction fee. All remaining fees in excess of the amount necessary to 
execute the transaction would refunded to the seller. At every step of the process, the amount of 
gas from the sender would be required to be equal to or greater than the amount needed to 
generate the transaction, or the system will throw an error. This also ensures safety from double 
spending, and ensures every action is paid for before it is conducted.  
The EVM also allows developers to execute at the code level. All Ethereum contracts are 
written in low-level stack-based bytecode language that can access account information on the 
Ethereum network. As such, Ethereum is classified as Turing Complete, which ensures that any 
type of code can be executed on the blockchain.  At its inception, Buterin envisioned Ethereum 
mining as PoW much like Bitcoin, but the system has since transitioned to proof-of-stake (PoS), 
which is described in further detail below. Regardless, the blockchain in Ethereum is similar to 
that of Bitcoin: each block is checked by miners to ensure that the timestamp precedes the new 
transaction and that the PoW/PoS is valid. However, Ethereum stores all state information within 
a block, removing the need for the blockchain to store all history of the chain, saving both data 
and space. Transactions and contracts are both executed in blocks (Ethereum White Paper).  
Thus, Buterin conceptualized Ethereum as an improvement to Bitcoin that utilized different 
types of opportunities on blockchain’s technical interface. Buterin’s ideas have since been hailed 
as successes: currently, Ethereum is trading at over $600, and has the second largest market 
share of all cryptocurrencies after Bitcoin (Ethereumprice.org) 
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 In light of corporate governance theory surrounding the optimal use of contracting, it is 
interesting to consider the ways in which smart contracts successfully subvert the main barriers 
commonly held to contracting. Almost paradoxically, the system of smart contracts expects 
immutable transactions to be executed by those without clearly defined roles. Contracting, 
according to corporate governance theory, is most useful when specifying specific transactions 
only because the cost of contracting is so high. Smart contracts eliminate most of the costs 
involved with enforcing contracts by having those costs programmed into the contract’s 
existence. This form of technical governance eliminates costs associated with decision rights, as 
it quickly compiles data from multiple users and takes actions on the network without any need 
for outside influence.  
Ethereum has many potential applications that arise from the functionality of smart 
contracts, including tokens, financial derivatives, and decentralized autonomous organizations 
(DAOs). The latter is perhaps one of the most novel uses of blockchain. The Ethereum White 
Paper defines DAOs as virtual entities that have a shareholder base, and can facilitate votes 
among this base to change its code. A simple version of a DAO might include code that alters 
itself if a certain percentage of shareholders (e.g. 51% or 67%) vote for the alteration. For 
example, Bitcoin is considered a fully functional DAO because it has a preprogrammed set of 
rules and functions autonomously through a distributed consensus protocol (CoinTelegraph, 
“What is DAO”). The code might include different levels of transactions that assign certain votes 
to shareholders, register votes in favor, and to finalize proposals once the vote count hits the 
desired total. Each of these actions would be represented as a clause in the contract, with each 
clause storing a history of changes. Additional features of DAOs could allow shareholders to add 
and remove members or buy and sell shares. 
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 DAOs are funded through open investment; the rationale for investing in a DAO varies, 
but often investors interested in the premise of a DAO buy in to acquire voting rights and to 
influence operations (CoinTelegraph). Once deployed, a DAO is autonomous from its founders 
and any people; it operates on a microscale like a cryptocurrency that makes decisions only 
based on consensus and a rigid proposal process. It is worth noting that DAOs themselves cannot 
create products and do require system upkeep, usually through a “contractor” (often a founder), 
and immediately voted upon by investors. Creators of DAOs experience similar incentives to buy 
into technology that they aligns with their own ideology.  An analysis of “The DAO”, a DAO 
that received widespread public attention due to issues of governance and hacking is presented 
below in further discussions on decision rights. In sum, DAOs represent a technical governance 
system built on smart contracts that operate independently from human control.  
 The governance of Ethereum mirrors the general structure of Bitcoin with a nonprofit 
foundation, developers, miners, and users. However there are distinctive differences in the 
composition of Ethereum within these structures. For one, the Ethereum Foundation seems to 
hold significant power over the direction of the currency due to its creation preceding the 
existence of Ethereum itself.  According to its official historical documentation, Ethereum was 
released in a coordinated presale in order to both fund ongoing development and establish a 
network of developers, miners, investors (Ethereum Homestead 2016, “History of Ethereum”). 
The legal complexities of the presale led to the creation of the Ethereum Foundation, a nonprofit 
headquartered in Switzerland that facilitated the sale; the profits of the sale went toward the legal 
fees associated with creating the Ethereum Foundation as well as prior uncompensated developer 
fees. The sale was based in Bitcoin, and netted over 50 million Ether, which was about $18 
million at the time (Ethereum Homestead). The involvement of the Ethereum Foundation in the 
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creation of Ethereum as an individual entity implies that the Foundation’s agenda, which is 
shaped primarily by core developers, holds precedence over the development of the system. This 
seems to indicate that entities that formed Ethereum are staked because they have a specific 
vision for its future. The Ethereum Foundation thus constitutes a more typical firm shareholding 
model, with the holders of Ether actively buying into the system and distributed ownership 
across a range of individuals and institutions, rather than coordinated through a singular third 
party. This represents a departure from the Bitcoin Foundation, which is independently funded. 
The Foundation also issues grants to developers in order to incentivize them utilize the system, 
indicating that the developers that use the system may be less intrinsically motivated toward a 
common goal. It is worth noting that there are some external funding sources that buy Ether to 
invest in the novel technical premise. Recently, the Ethereum Foundation has fielded donations 
from dubious sources including a Russian state bank (O’Leary 2017, ‘Misunderstanding’: Vitalik 
Buterin to Create New Entity for Russian Bank Deal.). The use of these sources indicate that it 
might be possible for actors external to Ethereum to influence the ideological direction that the 
Foundation chooses to implement through its developer grants.  
Due to its developer friendly,open-run environment, Ethereum has attracted a wide array 
of developers with different motivations that hope to utilize and build upon Ethereum’s many 
potential applications. The barriers to entry to create an application on Ethereum’s network are 
quite low, which incentivizes a greater range of potential participant developers to use the system 
(Github.com/go-Ethereum 2017, “Developer’s Guide”). As a result, more developers use 
Ethereum than any other cryptocurrency (Keys 2018).  Furthermore, the broad, exploration 
oriented mission of Ethereum ensures that the developers who join the system retain nearly 
autonomous creative control. While this has spawned a diverse set of applications, it also 
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indicates that developers are not necessarily united toward a common purpose; for example, 
widely varied implementations have sometimes been criticized by experienced developers as 
marketed deliberately to uneducated developers and have led to many unfinished projects (Breen 
2018). Many prominent academic computer scientists have come out against the logic that is 
required on the Ethereum system that makes it vulnerable to security threats, precisely because it 
attempts to allow for multiple implementations of applications (Russell 2017). Most recently, a 
temporary bug in the Ethereum system trapped hundreds of millions of dollars in the system, to 
users’ detriment (Russell). There seems to be a tradeoff between overall system effectiveness, 
and the ability to distribute technical and creative control across multiple individuals, leading to 
security concerns. The lack of governance toward developers in Ethereum may thus have 
unintentional negative consequences for the technical wellbeing of the currency.  
 Just as developer interest in Ethereum is wide ranging, user incentives to participate in 
Ethereum are also more varied. Users on the Ethereum system hold Ether tokens, vote on DAO 
proposals in the network, and utilize smart contracts for immutability in payments. They tend to 
be more technology oriented than the average Bitcoin user because the decentralized applications 
they opt into on the Ethereum system are worth Ether investment primarily for voting rights: 
knowledge of what technical changes to make and to operate in a DAO, for example, would lead 
to better and more rational decision making than an uninformed person (Olpinski 2016). Users of 
Ethereum also tend not to own other types of cryptocurrency, especially Bitcoin; their support is 
usually ideological and unilateral. There are no Ethereum instruments currently trading in the 
financial markets, but they will presumably come into being given the SEC’s approval, giving 
Ethereum further exposure to external actors. 
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 Miner incentives in Ethereum have shifted since the inception of the currency. They 
originally faced a similar circumstance to Bitcoin while utilizing PoW; however, the shift toward 
a PoS system from PoW has fundamentally changed the role of mining. According to the 
Ethereum website, PoS is a consensus algorithm that depends on the actor’s economic stake in 
the network1. While PoW uses the speed at which miners can solve cryptographic puzzles as a 
method to designate which miner is compensated for the transaction and to create new coins, PoS 
uses a more complex system of voting amongst miners that depends on the size of their Ether 
stake. PoS was proposed in order to combat the inherent problems with PoW that Bitcoin had 
come to exemplify: the rise of mining pools predisposed the network to a 51% attack, the energy 
consumption required to mine prohibited individuals from entering the system to prevent further 
mining pools. While Ethereum had originally used a PoW system, Buterin had always expressed 
desire to transition to PoS; the Ethereum community was largely supportive of the shift, as many 
problems, especially coordinated miner attacks, had come to light surrounding PoW 
(Github.com/go-Ethereum, “Proof-Of-Stake_FAQs”). Currently, Ethereum employs a variant of 
the Byzantine fault tolerant (BFT) type of PoS that was released as “The Casper Protocol” in 
October 2017 (Buterin and Griffith 2017). Ethereum as a whole is thus more conscious of the 
potential for miners to accumulate power, and strives to minimize it.  
Casper was envisioned as a security-deposit based consensus protocol that required 
miners to buy into Ether in order to paricipate. Buterin and Griffith proposed that Casper would 
help mitigate some of the main problems with the existing iteration of PoS, specifically the 
“Nothing at Stake” problem, and “long range attacks”. The Nothing at Stake problem resulted 
from properties of the PoS algorithm that specified both the stake and random frequency of 
success; in effect it incentivized miners to mine on every possible chain, and with enough of a 
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majority, could have led to miners coordinating forks in order to send and receive coins 
themselves. Long-range attacks occured when miners attempted to start a fork that was very far 
back on the chain, in order to replicate the entire blockchain; this confused participants because it 
led them to question which chain was technically “valid” (Li 2017).  In essence, PoS required a 
trusted source for the initial blockchain data to avoid replication. Casper eliminated both of these 
key issues through mechanisms that forced miners to form consensus blockchains, translating to 
miner activity becoming further restricted and removing much of the potential for miner power 
overreach.   
 The role of miners was impacted by the shift to PoS because of the need for miners a 
superior stake, rather than superior computing power, to retain a competitive advantage. PoS 
constructs a system where miners bet their security deposits on a blockchain based on how they 
expect everyone else to bet their deposits; the consensus derived from this bet creates the 
“objective” blockchain, and ensures that there will be a single chain that miners use. Miners first 
mine to discover blocks, and then attempt to validate the block by placing a bet on it; if and when 
the block gets appended, then miners receive a reward proportionate to their bets (A. Kiayias et 
al. 258).  If they bet correctly, they earn their deposit back through fixed transaction fees and 
token issuance (A. Kiayias et al. 2017, 258). Miners are thus incentivized to bet correctly 
because they would otherwise lose their deposit, lessening the stake and their potential to mine in 
the future(A. Kiayias et al. 258) . This game theory approach ensures that through multiple 
rounds of betting, miner bets eventually converge to the “true” chain. Coordinated hard forks by 
a collusion of miners could be reversed by the remainder of the community moving to the “true” 
chain; furthermore, the extensive supply of Ether necessary to fund an attack would inevitably 
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cause the currency value to increase. Thus, the primary role of miners in Ethereum is to approve 
the execution of the transaction, rather than its contents. 
 The transition to PoS has many important implications for miners. Because success is tied 
to the amount of Ether miners have, the alignment between the overall goals of Ethereum and 
successful validation is more salient, as it would seem counterproductive for a miner to sabotage 
a system in which their stake was reliant on the value of that system. This seems to reflect 
O’Mahony’s argument that the presence of property rights increases the buy in of economic 
actors in OSS. However, while the system is designed to curtail the rise of mining pools, it 
increases the wealth of individual miners by ensuring that the richest ones will continue to 
receive the benefits of validation. This would, over time, decrease the speed of block validation, 
even as the number of transactions per second on the Ethereum network increases exponentially. 
Because individual miners hold a great deal of power on the system, and because power is 
correlated to stake size, there is very little incentive for new miners to enter. Thus while PoS 
ensures that the system overall will be manipulated less easily by coalitions of miners, it makes 
individual miners more powerful instead. Over time, this could cause problems for Ethereum, as 
fewer miners will be incentivized the join the system and slow transaction speed and use. 
Meanwhile, the presence of fixed transaction fees that are proportional to the size and 
complexity of the transaction could eventually lead to transaction starvation for smaller 
payments, as has occurred in Bitcoin. 
 Because of the inherent structure of DAOs, decision rights in Ethereum are inextricably 
bound to the incentives for various actors, as the greatest influence an actor can wield is through 
voting power. Code changes and forks also comprise the majority of decision thus far for 
Ethereum. Much like in Bitcoin, code changes in Ethereum occur through formal Ethereum 
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improvement proposals (EIPs) that require community consensus. Because of the multifaceted 
nature of the Ethereum system, there are many more types of proposals, including those that are 
application specific and “Meta” EIPs that formalize the processes themselves (Ethereum.org, 
“Ethereum Improvement Proposals”). This in itself indicates a meta heightened awareness of how 
rules of governance should be structured in Ethereum by its users. Included in the EIP process is 
a “Deferred” status that anticipates potential adoption of a recommendation in the event of a 
future hard fork. This is emblematic of the overall EIP process attempting to normalize change 
on the system, even proposing software forks as an alternative to bureaucracy to get wider user 
buy in. In effect, Ethereum strives to allow users and developers to operate as self contained 
actors, rather than improving processes to achieve consensus around all issues. Core developers’ 
openness to flexibility has also caused them to embrace hard forks in order to promote 
continuous change in the system (Demeester 2016). The core development team of Ethereum, 
consisting of Buterin and six other developers hold commit access to EIPs, and also sit on the 
Ethereum Foundation Council. Many of Ethereum’s developers also worked on Bitcoin and thus 
also have pre-existing relationships with one another. In the interest of transparency, the notes to 
all the core development agenda meetings can be found online and users routinely comment with 
ideas, reactions, and feedback (‘Ethereum’, Github.com)  
 Perhaps the most salient example of the power developers exert in decision rights 
occurred in the prominent hacking of the infamous “DAO” in 2015. In understanding the 
significance of the event, it is first important to understand the purpose of DAOs from a 
governance perspective. Much like Williamson theorized, DAOs seek to mitigate transaction 
costs, specifically agency costs in which residual claimants hold important power hierarchies, 
information flow, and financial resources over shareholders. DAOs intend to eliminate agency 
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costs by putting power in the hands of shareholders; in the case of Ethereum, this means 
allowing people to vote on basic governance decisions with their Ether stake. For example, 
DAOs can allow for votes that determine when and if to hire an employee, and also can pay that 
person if the vote passes (Mehar 2017, 7). As Mehar notes, DAOS substitute “voluntary 
compliance to a corporation’s charter with actual compliance with a pre-agreed computer code” 
(7). One of the major advantages of the voluntary and distributed governance structure in DAOs 
is its ability to empower minority owners in decision making (in contrast to shareholder 
governance groups like ISS/Glass Lewis that represent shareholder views to companies).  
 The infamous DAO was created by Christoph and Simon Jentzsch, who envisioned a 
company called Slock.it that was the foundation of a decentralized sharing economy (Mehar 8). 
The basic structure of the DAO implied token holders that could release funds following 
successful votes on detailed proposals on various types of investments (8). The DAO gained 
considerable interest from investors around the world, with investments totaling $150 million. In 
June 2016, a developer on the web based software development platform Github revelaed a flaw 
in the DAO’s smart contract that allowed users to empty user balances over time without the 
balance change being recorded. Despite protestations by Ethereum founders and Slock.it 
founders, the DAO continued operations until it was hacked, five days later. The method of 
attack was exactly as had been foreshadowed: the so-called “hacker” used the code flow to 
repeatedly split the DAO’s balance into valid accounts in a duplicate DAO that could not be 
accessed until one month after the request (Mehar 10). Counterattack measures were taken to 
prevent the hacker from continuing the withdrawal, but he or she ultimately walked away with 
$50 million, constituting nearly 15% of the worldwide supply of Ether.  
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 There were three courses of action proposed in reaction to the DAO “hack”. The first was 
to protect the integrity of the code and do nothing; the rationale for this argument was that the 
attacker had technically not committed a crime or injustice against the system in his or her 
actions. The ability to slowly siphon money constituted a loophole in the smart contract. The 
second alternative was to soft fork in order ban use of the duplicate DAO that contained the 
“stolen funds”. The major ramification of this course of action was the loss of all investors’ 
Ether. Finally, the third choice was to get nearly universal consensus from all miners in order to 
return stolen Ether to the original DAO. Surprisingly, the third solution was strongly advocated 
for by the founders and core development of Ethereum, despite the fact that it violated the core 
principle of immutability on the network. After a vote, the majority of miners chose to hard fork 
and create a new chain where the blocks could not be tampered with. This spawned a forked 
altcoin, Ethereum Classic, whose miners operated on the original network, having chosen not to 
accede to the vote. The vote itself was controversial in that it prioritized voting power by users’ 
stake rather than “one user one vote” (12). As a result, users saw their Ether amounts double as 
they now existed simultaneously on two different chains.   
 This event demonstrated some of the flaws in the decentralized governance system 
proposed by DAOs. Developers’ decision to hard fork and thus deny the malicious attacker his 
earned reward demonstrated that core developers in Ethereum view their role as managing the 
technical system, and therefore superior to it. As Dupont (2017) notes, the algorithmic 
governance\, governance of a system by code and code alone, promised by DAOs was never in 
reality technology alone, involving the complex interplay of developers, miners, token holders, 
and even the Ethereum Foundation, much like the basis for this analysis of the macro-level 
cryptocurrency (12). In effect, Dupont notes “The DAO relied on a model of human behavior 
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and social constitution notionally based on liberal ideologies, where humans act as rational, self-
interested, and untrusting agents” (13). The way that the funds were taken represents a deviation 
from the expected result of the algorithmic structure, causes actors to fall back on social ties and 
community orientation. For example, the Ethereum Foundation’s support of the hard fork left 
many users themselves questioning the promise of decentralized governance when central 
authorities clearly had the capacity to dramatically influence outcomes to protect their 
reputations. In this particular situation, the return of the funds was only secondary to the 
wellbeing of the system to external shareholders: to ensure safe and continued use, developers 
ultimately had to make drastic code changes to protect their own vested interests. The 
developers' themselves probably constituted a large degree of the favorable vote. The method of 
voting during the DAO crisis also demonstrates some of the limitations in distributed governance 
with respect to decision rights. Most crucially, decentralized voting procedures that require a 
large percentage of stakeholder buy in to achieve consensus often must evolve over a long period 
of time in order to achieve a result. The Ethereum community quite literally observed the hacker 
stealing funds from the DAO without the ability to take action. Thus, the smart contract system 
of aggregating votes was sufficient but not optimal for the particular situation given the time 
horizon they were working on.  
The issues faced during the DAO hack have been replicated in recent events, including 
multiple hacks of the Parity startup system that have led to public calls for a more standardized 
fund recovery system (O’Leary 2018, “Ethereum Users Are Losing Money and Developers 
Don’t Quite Know What to Do”) A recent article by CoinDesk details this internal conflict. Led 
by developers from a startup, Tap Trust, internal conflict regarding the ability of users to be able 
to effect “state changes” in response to malicious activity has recently been present in the 
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network. The hack had resulted in four proposed code changes that according to core developers 
“conflicted with the ethos of Ethereum”.  In essence, if exceptions to code could exist on the 
network, the code itself would not immutable and its entire value proposition, its immutability 
and automatic execution, would be threatened. A second attempted fork, to core developers, 
would lead to more instability and set the precedent for continued regulation by developers of 
malicious activity. A distinct compromise has arisen between the speed of response and loyalty 
to code among users; many have voiced that Ethereum’s ability to adapt and act in users’ best 
interests at odds with the code is one of its greatest advantages. In a sense, community wide 
sentiment for code upgrades and changes should not be limited by the desires of core developers 
if there is a majority shareholding interest. Those in favor of greater restrictions point to the 
ability of core developers to heavily influence decisions as a negative aspect of the system 
(O’Leary) . Youchi Hirai, a core developer on the network, wrote in a recent post: “I wouldn’t 
move a finger for a recovery unless the amount is going to a few parties that can threaten the 
network (then I would prefer vaporizing away the amount rather than giving it back)”. This brings 
into question whEther and when certain governance structures should be used, and who should be 
controlling their implementation (Hirai 2018) . 
Ethereum developers are now seeking to improve and expand governance infrastructure 
on top of the network. A follow up article by CoinDesk that covered the recent Ethereum 
conference in Paris draws light on the ways developers are now considering governance. One of 
the biggest issues with the most recent proposal was the lack of clarity/transparency with which 
it was communicated to users. Greg Colvin, a prominent developer on the Ethereum network, 
has recently formed a coalition to coordinate best practices for open-source development. Colvin 
recalled the DAO decision among others as reasons to strengthen policies surrounding 
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governance of the system in order to find better ways to achieve consensus. The Ethereum 
community has expressed desire for more input in decision-making, which brings into question 
what the role of core developers should be on the network. Colvin cited the close-knit relations 
of core developers in the early stages of Ethereum development as crucial to achieving consensus 
in top down decision-making, a factor that has since become more complex by the addition of 
more core developers around the world. Colvin thus noted “in person communication” as deeply 
important to the network’s integrity.  
Colvin’s coalition aims to mitigate issues between the two major schools of thought 
within Ethereum: the notion that “code is king” and the desire from users to see greater 
transparency from the Ethereum Foundation regarding the direction and types of changes that it 
wishes to enact. Stemming from the DAO fork decision, developers ultimately have the power to 
propose action and thus control the two most important stages in the process: proposal and 
enaction. Furthermore, even though there is an approval process, the discourse surrounding 
whEther the change should be implemented is ultimately politicized. The purpose of the process 
is to both create productive debate among stakeholders and allow the market to decide which 
version of the software is more valuable externally. Ultimately, Colvin writes that he has found 
that “it’s hard to arrive at a technical proficiency if there’s a lack of clarity as to the direction of 
Ethereum”. Thus, the non-technical and technical governance aspects of Ethereum are 
inextricably bound (O’Leary 2018, “Ethereum is Throwing Out the Crypto Governance 
Playbook”).  
In conclusion, Ethereum has attempted to build upon Bitcoin’s success by creating a 
developing environment that is more open to change. The lack of governance surrounding 
developers, specifically the autonomous nature of developing in Ethereum and the involvement 
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of the core developers in the founding of Ethereum’s primary funding structure, raises questions 
about the amount of power concentrated within the group. Ethereum seems to be primarily 
designed for developers, not non-technical users, thus making developers both the curators and 
customers of the system itself. The power of developers was demonstrated in the decision 
making process after the DAO hack, indicating the top-down and relationship driven processes 
that core developers envision for the network. Finally, the reactions of the Ethereum community 
from the DAO hack seem to demonstrate that increased attention will be paid to governance 
moving forward. 
 
CONCLUSION  
 Analysis of both Bitcoin and Ethereum reveals that both cryptocurrencies have rich and 
developed non-technical governance structures that are crucial to their success. A descriptive 
overview of each cryptocurrency reveals that while each proposes a unique technical system to 
eliminate the need for TTPs, neither truly succeeds in eliminating the potential powers of 
stakeholders. In Bitcoin, the rise of mining pools and the ability of users to use external financial 
instruments to manipulate the price and profit gains create strong motivation to take over the 
system. In Ethereum, the precedent set by developers in rejecting the DAO and forcing a hard 
fork has created both the perception and potential for core developers to dictate the direction and 
composition of the system. In both cryptocurrencies, a lack of formalized structure in adapting to 
changes and accepting input from multiple stakeholders internal and external to the system has 
resulted in periods of instability.  
Despite the potential for manipulations, both Bitcoin and Ethereum remain relatively 
popular. Their systems are utilized at a high rate across all stakeholder groups, and there remains 
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to be a tremendous amount of excitement around the long term and lasting consequences on the 
ways that transactions can be processed on each systems. Among cryptocurrencies, both Bitcoin 
and Ethereum have generated strong followings that indicate they have community support and 
potential to succeed. Furthermore, despite forking events and security concerns, the majority of 
potential power usurpations have not been undertaken on the network. For example, mining 
pools have existed and continued to grow without system-wide repercussions for Bitcoin, and 
DAOs continue to proliferate and seek funding in Ethereum. The relative success of these 
cryptocurrencies despite the demonstrated weaknesses in their technical interfact and governance 
structures beg the question: given that there have been a number of opportunities to take 
advantage of the system, why have there not been a proliferation of adverse events?  
This paper hypothesizes that the answer lies in the very concept that Nakamoto believed 
Bitcoin could overcome: trust. Throughout research on the topic of cryptocurrencies, trust, 
especially among developers and by other stakeholders upon developers and miners to satisfy the 
needs of system, has been a key theme. For example, the emergence of new lead developers was 
based on their reputational value, rather than any technical interface. Much as Williamson and 
March hypothesized, trust served as a mitigating factor that underscored sometimes ill-defined 
governance based relationships within actors. Furthermore, trust could be a reason for their 
ineffectiveness: for example, the desire of Ethereum developers to return money in the DAO 
stems from the trust that they wanted to cultivate from users. This trust mitigates malicious 
behavior because of pre existing communities and because of the intrinsic desire that 
accompanies participation in the system. In effect, blockchain technology has in many ways 
strengthened the need for better understanding of trust networks among individuals in order to 
support the technological interface.  
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 The ultimate conclusion of this analysis indicates that the governance of cryptocurrency 
reflects its theoretical promise: individuals’ desire to innovate to increase their stake and power 
within any given system will always create the need for governance, regardless of the novelty of 
the technical interface that underlies it. The need for actors within cryptocurrency, especially 
miners and developer, to cooperate and collaborate across a joint resource in the long term 
necessitates non-technical governance to ensure this innovation does not occur. Far from 
achieving the utopian promise of technical governance, cryptocurrency has endured growing 
pains resulting from the absence of these very systems. The technology alone is and will not be 
enough to sustain the wellbeing of cryptocurrency in the long term. This is evidenced not just by 
the conclusions of this paper, but by the actors within these cryptocurrencies themselves: as 
previously mentioned, Bitcoin developers have begun to develop a richly nuanced decision rights 
system since its fork, and lead developer Colvin is actively leading discussions about 
strengthening the premise and rules within Ethereum governance. As March theorized, the 
structure of governance within cryptocurrency is being bargained for by multiple stakeholder 
groups (671). In effect, this paper highlights that stakeholders of Bitcoin, Ethereum, and other 
cryptocurrencies should actively be thinking about the design and structure of their governance 
systems instead of attempting to avoid it entirely.  
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